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Biometric Boom: How the Private Sector 
Commodifies Human Characteristics 
Elizabeth M. Walker* 
 
Biometric technology has become an increasingly common part of 
daily life. Although biometrics have been used for decades, recent ad-
vances and new uses have made the technology more prevalent, particu-
larly in the private sector. This Note examines how widespread use of 
biometrics by the private sector is commodifying human characteristics. 
As the use of biometrics has become more extensive, it exacerbates and 
exposes individuals and industry to a number of risks and problems asso-
ciated with biometrics. Despite public belief, biometric systems may be 
bypassed, hacked, or even fail. The more a characteristic is utilized, the 
less value it will hold for security purposes. Once compromised, a biome-
tric cannot be replaced as would a password or other security device. 
This Note argues that there are strong justifications for a legal struc-
ture that builds hurdles to slow the adoption of biometrics in the private 
sector. By examining the law and economics and personality theories of 
commodification, this Note identifies market failure and potential harm 
to personhood due to biometrics. The competing theories justify a reform 
to protect human characteristics from commodification. This Note 
presents a set of principles and tools based on defaults, disclosures, incen-
tives, and taxation to discourage use of biometrics, buying time to streng-
then the technology, educate the public, and establish legal safeguards for 
when the technology is compromised or fails. 
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On any given afternoon, a person shops at a grocery store, 
withdraws money from an ATM, and checks her smartphone a 
dozen times. Except she performs these tasks with a biometric: the 
grocery store implemented a system to pay with a fingerprint, the 
bank’s ATM requires a fingerprint instead of a PIN, and a finger-
print unlocks the screen of her smartphone. These uses of finger-
prints are enormously convenient, and perhaps the individual feels 
more secure because her accounts are protected by something that 
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is attached to her body. But how many other things did she touch 
that day? Probably door handles, coffee cups, light switches, tables, 
books, and countless other things. Does that mean she left her 
“password” or “key” on all these items? Suppose her bank noti-
fies her that it suffered a data breach. How does she change her fin-
gerprint? 
Fingerprints are merely a type of biometric. The term biome-
trics is often used interchangeably to describe a characteristic or a 
method.1 As a characteristic, biometrics means measurable physio-
logical or behavioral characteristics of a person that may be used 
for recognition.2 Measurable physiological characteristics include 
fingerprints, face, iris, retina, and hand geometry; examples of 
measurable behavioral characteristics are voice, keystroke, signa-
ture, and gait.3 As a method, biometrics means the process of au-
tomated recognition based on a person’s measurable characteris-
tic.4 Biometric systems essentially make the human body “ma-
chine-readable.”5 
Scholarly analysis of biometrics generally relates to government 
uses, such as national security and surveillance.6 However, this 
                                                                                                                            
1 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND 
EAVESDROPPING § 31:1 (2013). This Note primarily uses “biometrics” to refer to human 
measurable characteristics and uses “biometric system” when discussing the recognition 
process. 
2 See NSTC SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, BIOMETRICS “FOUNDATION DOCUMENTS” 1 
(2006), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/biofoundationdocs.pdf 
[hereinafter Foundation Documents]. 
3 See Ishwar K. Sethi, Biometrics: Overview and Applications, in PRIVACY AND 
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 117, 117 (Katherine 
J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006). There is some debate as to whether DNA 
is a biometric because DNA recognition is not currently automated. See Foundation 
Documents, supra note 2, at 21. 
4 See Foundation Documents, supra note 2, at 1. 
5 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in 
Biometric Technology, 00720/12/EN, WP 193, at 4 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2012/wp193_en.pdf [hereinafter WP 193]. 
6 See, e.g., Lauren D. Adkins, Biometrics: Weighing Convenience and National Security 
Against Your Privacy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 541 (2007); Laura K. 
Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric 
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012); Margaret Hu, Biometric ID 
Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475 (2013); Rudy Ng, Catching Up To Our Biometric 
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Note examines the rapidly expanding use of biometrics by the pri-
vate sector. Does extensive use across industries accelerate the 
transformation of nonsalable attributes into market goods? For 
what purposes is it justified to use something so closely associated 
with oneself? This Note claims that widespread use of biometrics 
by the private sector is commodifying human characteristics and 
exacerbating other risks and problems associated with biometrics. 
Biometrics are not new. For decades, law enforcement has used 
fingerprint analysis during criminal investigations.7 However, in 
the last few decades, technology has helped to automate the 
process and allow more human characteristics to be utilized for 
recognition.8 These technological advancements, coupled with 
growing concerns for terrorism and cybersecurity, are propelling 
the growth of biometric technology.9 Biometrics offer a number of 
advantages over other security systems. The characteristics are 
well-suited as identifiers because they are unique to each individu-
al.10 Also, biometric identifiers are convenient; because humans 
carry the characteristic on their body at all times and it cannot be 
forgotten, biometrics eliminate the need to remember PINs and 
passwords or to carry identification documents.11 
However, this Note demonstrates that the private sector’s use 
of biometrics raises significant privacy and security concerns. Pri-
vacy is about power over information, determining who should 
access and use information.12 Companies are beginning to collect 
                                                                                                                            
Future: Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric Identification Technology, 28 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 425 (2006). 
7 See Donohue, supra note 6, at 418–19; NANCY YUE LIU, BIO-PRIVACY: PRIVACY 
REGULATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIOMETRICS 4 (2012). 
8 See Foundation Documents, supra note 2, at 7; LIU, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
9 See LIU, supra note 7, at 3. 
10 See Robyn Moo-Young, “Eyeing” the Future: Surviving the Criticisms of Biometric 
Authentication, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 422 (2001). It should be noted that biometrics 
are not truly universal as some individuals may not have a specific characteristic due to 
disease, birth defects, or other causes, which could lead to discrimination as biometric 
systems are more widely implemented. See LIU, supra note 7, at 68. 
11 See Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric 
Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 662 (2003); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 201 (2011). 
12 See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 
673 (2013). 
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biometrics in exchange for something else or without an individu-
al’s knowledge. Because biometrics are easily obtained, individuals 
are left powerless over the collection and use of their characteris-
tics. Similarly, if an individual is left with a binary choice of wheth-
er to provide biometrics or forgo a product, the collector has all the 
power in the transaction. 
Security, on the other hand, determines who can actually 
access and use information; it implements the privacy choices.13 
Biometrics are being used as a security measure; attributes are pro-
tecting other personal information. Most individuals believe that 
biometrics systems are accurate and secure. However, this Note 
demonstrates the alarming number of flaws in biometric systems, 
such as the countless ways in which biometrics can be hacked and 
compromised. Further, a significant risk with biometrics is that 
they are irreplaceable. Reliance is rapidly being placed on human 
attributes that cannot be changed. In a world where data breaches 
are common occurrences, individuals should be prepared to change 
passwords and other security measures frequently. The numerous 
risks associated with biometrics are accentuated as the technology 
becomes more prevalent. 
This Note argues that widespread use, propelled by the private 
sector, causes more parties to be interested in biometrics. As more 
biometric systems are implemented, unique human characteristics 
become more commonplace, heightening concerns for irreplacea-
bility and security. This Note demonstrates that competing theo-
ries of commodification justify reform to protect biometrics. The 
law and economics approach, which places all things in the free 
market, allows intervention when faced with an inefficient market. 
Extensive evidence demonstrates that the nature of privacy, biome-
trics, and human cognition result in market failure. A similar con-
clusion is reached when biometrics are analyzed under Margaret 
Radin’s personality theory, where personal attributes are too per-
sonal to be monetized. Rather, the noncommodified version of 
biometrics fosters personhood and improves social interactions. 
This Note concludes that there are strong justifications for a le-
gal structure that builds hurdles to slow the adoption of biometrics 
                                                                                                                            
13 See id. at 676–78. 
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in the private sector. Based on choice architecture, this Note 
presents a system of defaults, disclosures, and incentives to push 
the private sector, and individuals, away from utilizing biometrics. 
There is no way to prevent the use of biometrics altogether, but 
forcing companies and individuals to slow down will give society 
time to consider the risks, fortify security, and build safeguards for 
when the technology is compromised or fails. The proposed prin-
ciples and set of tools are consistent with the self-regulation and 
limited government regulation traditions of the United States. 
Part I explains how biometric technology operates and how the 
private sector is using biometrics. The discussion assesses the se-
curity vulnerabilities and serious risks of using biometrics. Part II 
explores competing theoretical views of commodification and con-
cludes that due to the nature of biometrics and problems with pri-
vacy, intervention and reform are needed to govern biometrics. 
Part III describes available legal tools that may be applied to biome-
trics. The discussion suggests that current legal structures are in-
adequate to govern biometrics in the United States, but that a hybr-
id solution may be more effective. Part IV proposes a set of prin-
ciples to guide collection, use, and storage of biometrics by the pri-
vate sector. The proposal attempts to establish hurdles to slow the 
adoption and discourage private entities and individuals from uti-
lizing biometrics. 
I. BIOMETRICS OVERVIEW 
This Part provides an overview of biometric technology. First, 
there is an explanation of how the technology operates and its vul-
nerabilities. This Part also reviews the private sector’s growing list 
of diverse biometric implementations. Finally, there is a discussion 
of how the private sector’s rapid adoption is spurring the commo-
dification of biometrics, which in turn is aggravating other prob-
lems associated with the technology. 
2015] BIOMETRIC BOOM 837 
 
A. System Operation & Vulnerabilities 
Biometric systems are pattern recognition systems most often 
used to verify or identify an individual.14 The first phase of the 
process is enrollment where an individual’s biometric characteris-
tic is captured by a sensor device.15 The device extracts key fea-
tures from the characteristic and produces a mathematical model 
called a template.16 The system predetermines which features it 
will extract and use for matching, and the templates only encode 
those extracted features.17 
The second phase is either verification or identification.18 An 
individual presents her characteristic to the device and the system 
conducts a search to match the presented characteristic against ex-
isting templates.19 Matching results are based on statistical certain-
ty that the presented characteristic and existing template are from 
the same person.20 Verification, or “one-to-one” matching, is used 
to confirm an individual; the system matches the presented charac-
teristic against the individual’s claimed identity.21 Identification, or 
“one-to-many” matching, is used to recognize an individual; the 
system searches a database of stored templates to match the pre-
sented characteristic.22 The identification process depends on a 
database of stored templates; however, verification may match 
templates stored in a database or stored locally in a token or identi-
fication card.23 
The benefit of biometric systems is that they are more secure 
than other security measures currently available. Biometrics pro-
duce significantly longer data streams than any password a human 
                                                                                                                            
14 See Sethi, supra note 3, at 119; Stephen Hoffman, Biometrics, Retinal Scanning, and 
the Right to Privacy in the 21st Century, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 38, 46 (2010). 
15 See LIU, supra note 7, at 32. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 119–20. 
18 See Sethi, supra note 3, at 120. 
19 See id. at 120–21. 
20 See LIU, supra note 7, at 33. 
21 See Sethi, supra note 3, at 118. 
22 See id. 
23 See LIU, supra note 7, at 32. 
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could recall.24 Long passwords are more secure against attacks than 
shorter passwords.25 However, just because the technology is more 
secure by comparison does not mean that it is secure in and of it-
self. The technology actually has a number of troubling vulnerabili-
ties.26 One point of attack is faking—also called “spoofing”—the 
characteristic.27 Studies have shown that biometric systems can be 
bypassed with fake fingerprints and high resolution images of eyes 
and faces.28 Another potential breach is through modifying the 
template, which is based on a discrete number of features.29 Some-
one looking to bypass the system would only need to know the fea-
tures the system uses and would not have to replicate the exact 
characteristic.30 Finally, because a characteristic is saved as data, a 
template may be decoded leaving biometric systems vulnerable to 
hacking just like other password-based systems.31 
A related concern is the ongoing cybersecurity arms race.32 
Even as security measures become more advanced, hackers contin-
ue to find flaws, causing security to be repaired and further streng-
thened.33 This constant back-and-forth game means that hackers 
are usually ahead of security experts.34 Technology will always be 
                                                                                                                            
24 See Nalini K. Ratha et al., An Analysis of Minutiae Matching Strength, in AUDIO- AND 
VIDEO-BASED BIOMETRIC PERSON AUTHENTICATION: THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE, AVBPA 2001 HALMSTAD, SWEDEN, JUNE 2001 PROCEEDINGS 225 (Springer 
2001), available at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~rossarun/BiometricsTextBook/Papers/
Security/Ratha_MinaMatchingStrength_AVBPA01.pdf. 
25 See id. 
26 For a longer discussion on biometric system security and vulnerability, see Anil K. 
Jain & Ajay Kumar, Biometric Recognition: An Overview, in SECOND GENERATION 
BIOMETRICS: THE ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 49, 60–65 (Emilio Mordini & 
Dimitros Tzovaras eds., 2012); Gang Wei & Dongge Li, Biometrics: Applications, 
Challenges and the Future, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 135, 142–45 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu 
eds., 2006). 
27 See Jain & Kumar, supra note 26, at 60–61. 
28 See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 202; Sethi, supra note 3, at 131–32. 
29 See Jain & Kumar, supra note 26, at 61. 
30 See id. 
31 See DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK 204 (Lucy L. Thomson ed., 2011). 
32 See Harry Bruinius, Feds Hacked: Is Cybersecurity a Bigger Threat Than Terrorism?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/
1110/Feds-hacked-Is-cybersecurity-a-bigger-threat-than-terrorism-video. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
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vulnerable to sophisticated hackers.35 Even if biometrics are cur-
rently more secure than other security measures, that does not 
mean that they will always be more secure. 
There is also a common misconception that biometric systems 
are precise. Rather, it is actually impossible for a biometric system 
to be 100% accurate.36 The results are based on statistical certainty 
and—by the nature of the technology—the system must accept 
false positives and false negatives.37 
These flaws are significant. The movement towards biometrics 
is based on the belief that the systems are secure and accurate, two 
arguments easily refuted. As the following section demonstrates, 
biometrics are being rapidly adopted for a variety of uses. However, 
in light of the technological vulnerabilities, it seems foolish that the 
technology is being relied upon so heavily. 
B. Expanding Uses 
The government was an early adopter of biometric technology, 
and its predominant use of the technology is for security purposes. 
The Department of Homeland Security uses fingerprint scanning 
and facial-recognition technology to record the identities of visitors 
to the United States.38 Similarly, many states require fingerprint 
scanning to confirm an individual’s identity before distributing wel-
fare or unemployment benefits.39 Some public schools have even 
begun allowing children to pay for lunch using their finger- or 
handprint.40 
However, the private sector has also begun implementing bio-
metric systems. Without any restrictions on what can be collected 
or how it may be used, industry is rapidly expanding the prevalence 
of biometric systems. Security is the most common purpose for 
which the private sector uses biometrics. Examples include Ap-
                                                                                                                            
35 See id. 
36 See Hu, supra note 6, at 1535. 
37 See id.; LIU, supra note 7, at 33. 
38 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 1, § 31:38. 
39 See id. § 31:43. 
40 See School Cafeterias Trading Lunch Money For Fingerprint Scans, CBS CHI. (July 2, 
2014, 12:49 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/07/02/school-cafeterias-trading-
lunch-money-for-fingerprint-scans/. 
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ple’s Touch ID, which allows users to unlock their phones and tab-
lets with a fingerprint;41 amusement parks, including Disney 
World, require patrons to scan their fingerprints to use passes;42 
some ATMs are equipped with fingerprint scanners;43 MasterCard 
announced a fingerprint-enabled credit card;44 and some hospitals 
are scanning patient hands in order to retrieve the correct medical 
records.45 Recently, banks have begun storing and processing voice 
samples of customers calling about their accounts to create a 
“voiceprint.”46 The bank will use the voiceprint to verify the cus-
tomer’s identity and prevent fraudsters from gaining access to an 
account over the telephone.47 
Companies are also beginning to explore other purposes for 
biometric technology. A recent trend in biometric use is to provide 
a value-add service based on individuals’ characteristics. Facebook 
launched a feature that “tagged” individuals in uploaded images.48 
The site collected and stored biometric information from millions 
of users and utilized facial recognition technology to automatically 
identify the individuals.49 Another example of a value-add use of 
biometrics is Google Audio History.50 This opt-in service retains 
recordings of voice searches or commands so the company can 
learn the sound of an individual’s voice and provide better results 
when speech recognition products are used.51 
                                                                                                                            
41 See Use Touch ID on iPhone and iPad, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT5883 (last modified Mar. 3, 2015). 
42 SEE FINGER SCANNING AT THEME PARKS, MY FOX ORLANDO (MAY 9, 2012, 11:58 
PM), http://www.myfoxorlando.com/story/18248551/finger-scanning-at-theme-parks. 
43 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 1, § 31:46. 
44 See Darrell Etherington, MasterCard Will Borrow a Touch ID Trick for Fingerprint 
Scanning Credit Card, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 17, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/
17/mastercard-will-borrow-a-touch-id-trick-for-fingerprint-scanning-credit-card/. 
45 See Eliene Augenbraun, How Biometric Palm Scans Help Keep Hospitals Secure, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patientsecure-
biometric-palm-scan-system-hospital-security/. 
46 See Raphael Satter, Banks Harvest Callers’ Voiceprints to Fight Fraud, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 13, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/
13/voiceprints-harveted/17207381/. 
47 See id. 
48 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 1, § 31:45. 
49 See id. 
50 See Google Voice & Audio History, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
websearch/answer/6030020 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
51 See id. 
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Finally, the private sector is also using biometrics for advertis-
ing. Digital billboards can use facial recognition to identify a view-
er’s gender, age, and ethnicity.52 For example, an advertising cam-
paign in London only displayed advertisements to women who 
looked at the billboard.53 The ability to use biometrics for advertis-
ing is an emerging field, with some companies exploring how they 
can use social media photographs to identify an individual in the 
real world.54 
Use of biometrics has become much more expansive in recent 
months, and it is likely that the private sector will devise further 
uses for biometrics. Such pervasive and widespread uses reduce the 
effectiveness of human attributes for security purposes, exposing 
the data to more system vulnerabilities. It also degrades the value 
of the characteristics as security identifiers. Suddenly the private 
sector values fingerprints, eyes, voices, and faces more significantly 
than the individuals do. 
C. Commodification and Other Risks 
Biometrics share many similarities with personal information, 
and the problems plaguing information privacy and security are al-
so relevant concerns for biometrics. Personal information has been 
commodified; it is now a type of good that can be exchanged for 
something else.55 Two factors that significantly contributed to the 
commodification of personal information were technology and the 
private sector. Technology changed the way information is col-
lected, used, and stored. Personal information, which was once dif-
ficult to acquire and process, has been made significantly easier to 
access by advances in technology. The ease of information flow was 
                                                                                                                            
52 See Michael Fitzpatrick, Advertising Billboards Use Facial Recognition to Target 
Shoppers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
media/pda/2010/sep/27/advertising-billboards-facial-recognition-japan. 
53 See Erica Ho, Face-Recognizing Billboard Shows Ad to Women Only, TIME (Feb. 23, 
2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/02/23/face-recognizing-billboard-shows-ad-to-
women-only/. 
54 See Chris Strohm, Facial Recognition on Facebook to IPhone Awaits U.S. Code, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-
16/facial-recognition-on-facebook-to-iphone-awaits-u-s-code.html (discussing Redpepper 
facial recognition application). 
55 See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 
2069 (2004). 
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exacerbated by the private sector sharing and aggregating informa-
tion. 
An example of this downward spiral is the Social Security num-
ber. Social Security numbers were never intended as a general use 
identifier.56 However, because everyone has one, the government 
and the private sector have adopted it as an identifier.57 As more 
institutions adopted the number, it became less effective as a pass-
word.58 Technology sped up dispersal of the numbers.59 Today, the 
Social Security number is considered the most valuable piece of 
information to a criminal because it is a “skeleton key” for all ac-
counts.60 
Given how the private sector and technology spurred the com-
modification of social security numbers, extensive industry use of 
biometrics also commodifies human characteristics. Despite using 
biometrics for years, technology has automated the process and 
allowed for the storage and processing of more characteristics than 
were possible before. Recent private sector uses show how these 
characteristics are being collected and used at an alarming rate.61 
As is occurring with personal information, companies are collecting 
biometrics in exchange for goods and services, or even without the 
knowledge of the individuals. This leaves individuals without the 
power to choose how to control their own biometrics. The private 
sector’s behavior is propelling the widespread use of biometrics, 
which reduces their effectiveness for security. Further, commodifi-
cation exacerbates existing problems and risks associated with bio-
metrics. 
While some problems are the result of information privacy gen-
erally, biometrics also carry their own unique set of risks. The most 
significant risk with using biometrics is that the characteristics are 
                                                                                                                            
56 See Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, 69(2) SOC. SECURITY 
BULL., 55, 67, (2009) available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/v69n2
p55.pdf. 
57 See id. 
58 See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social 
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 
(2008). 
59 See id. at 5. 
60 See id. at 4, 10. 
61 See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text. 
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irreplaceable.62 Currently, if a database is hacked, an individual can 
change her password or request a new credit card. However, if the 
system uses biometric verification for its security and the database 
is compromised, she cannot change or replace her fingerprint, eye, 
face, or other characteristics.63 Another concern is that biometrics 
cannot be stored anonymously because they are, by their nature, 
identifying information.64 The ability to link a person to data is a 
critical privacy issue and central to existing privacy regulations.65 
Finally, unlike passwords which must remain secret to be effective, 
many biometrics are publicly accessible and can be captured with-
out an individual knowing. Individuals leave their fingerprints on 
countless items every day, and their faces and voices are shared 
with those around them. The availability of the characteristics mi-
nimizes their effectiveness for security.66 
Another risk associated with biometrics is that there is no ade-
quate legal structure to govern the technology. As use of biometrics 
expands, proponents of the technology praise it as reliable and fool-
proof.67 However, they are focused on the benefits without consi-
dering the consequences that will result when the technology 
fails.68 Privacy scholar Daniel Solove calls this the “Titanic Phe-
nomenon.”69 Builders of the Titanic were so confident of its unsin-
                                                                                                                            
62 See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 202. 
63 That is not to say it is impossible with advancements in transplant science. However, 
if these types of transplants were to become possible, it seems an extreme measure to take 
when a biometric system is compromised. Further, the ability to replace characteristics 
dilutes the argument that biometrics are more secure than passwords. 
64 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics, 
12168/02/EN, WP 80, at 5 (Aug. 1, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf. 
65 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and A New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). 
66 See Sethi, supra note 3, at 127–28 (describing covert collection of biometrics, 
including facial recognition). 
67 See, e.g., Hu, supra note 6, at 1477–78; Biometric Identifiers and the Modern Face of 
Terror: New Technologies in the Global War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairperson of Subcomm. on 
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information) (“Biometric identifiers are the 
most secure and convenient way to authenticate and identify people because they cannot 
be borrowed, stolen, forgotten or forged.”). 
68 See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 199. 
69 See id. 
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kability that they did not have enough lifeboats when the ship 
sank.70 Solove believes the same is true of biometrics: proponents 
view the technology as infallible, but biometric systems will fail 
and, when they do, there will not be adequate safeguards.71 Perhaps 
the risk of biometrics failing was less significant a year or more ago, 
or that fewer individuals and institutions would be affected if a 
biometric system did fail. However, the private sector’s increased 
use of biometrics has reached a critical point. If there once was 
time to develop the technology and educate the public, the rapid 
implementation of biometric systems has taken all that time away. 
Instead, a flawed technology is being implemented and the public 
has misconceptions of its reliability. The reach of biometrics now 
ensures that should a system fail, or should an individual’s charac-
teristic be compromised, the effects will be extensive and disastr-
ous. Solove does not propose preventing the use of biometrics 
completely, merely that society prepare itself and build proper legal 
protections.72 One way to accomplish this is to consider the private 
sector’s commodification and explore whether there is any way to 
justify intervention. 
II. JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION: COMPETING THEORIES OF 
COMMODIFICATION 
As discussed in the previous section, commodification aggra-
vates risks associated with biometrics. This Part examines compet-
ing commodification theories and concludes that intervention in 
the emerging biometric market is justified. The first critique con-
siders economic theory, which supports unrestricted transfers of 
biometrics, and points to market failure as an argument against 
trading biometrics. The second critique examines the personality 
theory, which opposes commodified biometrics because they harm 
personhood, and suggests the concept of “market-inalienable” 
where only monetized versions of biometrics are forbidden. 
                                                                                                                            
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 201–02. 
72 See id. at 203. 
2015] BIOMETRIC BOOM 845 
 
A. Biometrics as Market Transactions 
Economics is concerned with efficiency. The basic definition of 
efficiency is Pareto efficiency, which exists in a voluntary market 
transaction where both parties benefit from the transaction.73 Law 
and economics scholars have applied economic theory to nonmar-
ket behavior, creating a metaphorical market in which everything 
becomes a market transaction.74 This approach treats human 
attributes, relationships, and social interactions as commodities.75 
Such an expansive view of tradable goods stems from Hobbes who 
believed that any part of a person that someone else needs, wants, 
or values is something with a price.76 This unrestricted choice of 
what goods to trade promotes autonomy.77 Such a system of volun-
tary transfers is presumptively efficient.78 
The economic approach sees biometrics as salable or tradable. 
This approach equates a fingerprint with a bar of soap or a bottle of 
soda; identities reduced to nuts and bolts. Companies currently 
provide goods and services in exchange for an individual’s personal 
information.79 Similar biometric exchanges are already occurring, 
with companies trading services for characteristics.80 There is also 
a growing reliance on biometrics for security.81 Using biometrics 
for these purposes creates a market for human attributes and iden-
tities. Individuals and companies are suddenly placing a monetary 
value where there previously was none. A biometric would be 
traded to whoever values it the most. Economic theory supports 
these voluntary exchanges so long as they lead to efficient out-
comes. 
                                                                                                                            
73 See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 189–90 (2004). 
74 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–14 (1976) 
(applying an economic analysis to nonmarket behavior). 
75 See generally id. (arguing that discrimination, marriage, and children are market 
transactions). 
76 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 67 (Oxford Univ. Press 1929) (1651). 
77 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13–15 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2002) 
(1962) (arguing that private economic activity in a free market creates economic 
freedom). 
78 See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 190. 
79 See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2069. 
80 See supra Part I.B. 
81 See id. 
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Pareto efficiency depends on ideal circumstances, such as when 
parties to a transaction are rational, well informed, and operate in a 
competitive market.82 However, “market failure” occurs in the 
absence of such ideals, when the market is no longer efficient.83 In-
dicia of market failure include externalities, public goods, informa-
tion asymmetries, and cognitive limitations.84 Economists argue 
that when markets fail, intervention is necessary to remedy the par-
ties’ misaligned incentives.85 Government regulation is a common 
example of market intervention, but the reform could be any force 
that changes the behavior of parties in the market.86 
Many privacy scholars argue that information privacy suffers 
from market failure.87 The following sections will use these argu-
ments to draw comparisons between personal information and 
biometrics. These sections demonstrate that, just as with informa-
tion privacy, biometrics suffer from market failure. 
1. Externalities 
It may not always be possible for an individual to fully assess all 
the costs and benefits of a transaction.88 Some transactions have 
implications for society that are not fully realized when an individ-
ual pursues her own self-interest.89 In such a transaction, the indi-
vidual’s cost is less than the true cost to society.90 She pursues 
transactions that look good because they do not account for the ac-
                                                                                                                            
82 See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 
11, 11 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). 
83 See id.; THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 31 (2004). 
84 See MICELI, supra note 83, at 31–32; Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral 
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1834 (2013). 
85 See Stiglitz, supra note 82, at 13. 
86 See id. at 22 n.2 (considering taxation and tort law as types of market-curing reform). 
87 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2076; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: BIG 
DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (2014), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_dat
a_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf; David L. Baumer et al., Tit for Tat in Cyberspace: 
Consumer and Website Responses to Anarchy in the Market for Personal Information, 4 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. 217, 242 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A 
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 476 (2000). 
88 See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 117. 
89 See id. 
90 See MICELI, supra note 83, at 31. 
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tual cost of her actions.91 The individual cannot internalize all the 
costs, and thus imposes some costs—or “negative externalities”—
on others.92 
Negative externalities exist when an individual’s privacy choic-
es impose harms upon others.93 An individual could choose to dis-
regard her own privacy by sharing her biometrics with collecting 
companies. She believes she will benefit from the convenience and 
safety of using biometrics, and foresees the only potential costs as 
risking her own data. However, her choice supports questionable 
business methods.94 If a company utilizes databases or shares indi-
viduals’ biometrics, then her choice to enroll in its system supports 
practices that can harm others. Likewise, she will be supporting the 
use of biometrics as a security tool, which could become perverse 
the more widely it is used. 
Similarly, when a company chooses to utilize biometrics, it 
harms individuals enrolled in the system. A company that decides 
to implement a biometric system considers the benefits of added 
security and reduced fraud. However, the company fails to consid-
er the costs imposed on its customers. An individual may not have 
a choice whether to withhold her biometric, preventing her from 
making her own privacy decisions. Further, enrollment exposes an 
individual to unnecessary security risks, forcing her to rely on a 
vulnerable and irreplaceable security measure. The individual bears 
the cost, which is external to the company. The company has no 
incentive to minimize or properly safeguard its use of the technolo-
gy. 
A company collecting biometrics also imposes costs on individ-
uals beyond its own customer base. If a biometric system is com-
promised, it could cause a ripple effect throughout biometric sys-
tems used by other companies because the same characteristic may 
be enrolled in multiple systems. Individuals in those other systems 
are harmed, even if they are not enrolled in the hacked system. 
                                                                                                                            
91 See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 117. 
92 See id. 
93 See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and 
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 445 (2011). 
94 See Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Own Information Privacy?, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 845, 862 (2013). 
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Even where individuals or companies attempt to take precautions, 
they will be harmed by others who are not as cautious when they 
use biometrics. 
2. Public Goods 
A public good is something that is inexhaustible (when con-
sumption of the good by one person does not reduce the available 
quantity for others) and nonexclusive (when no one can be denied 
consumption of the good, even if he did not pay for the good).95 
When nonpaying individuals consume public goods, they create the 
“free rider problem.”96 Failure to exclude the nonpayers causes a 
good to be overused or degraded.97 This creates negative externali-
ties because the nonpayer does not experience the full cost of its 
actions.98 Often cited examples of public goods include clean air, 
public parks, and national defense.99 
Information is also a public good.100 It is either difficult or inef-
ficient to exclude others from having a piece of information, and 
once it is paid for it can be used and transferred at no cost.101 Bio-
metric data is a type of information—whether in the form of data 
or as a permanent human characteristic—and thus is a public good. 
Providing a biometric to one company does not preclude an indi-
vidual from sharing the same biometric with many other compa-
nies. Also, as previously discussed, biometrics are often freely 
available to the public.102 Society benefits from social interaction 
and the ability to recognize others. The only way to prevent the 
sharing of biometrics would be to live in isolation. 
Biometric collectors may also be nonpayers. Because many cha-
racteristics can be collected at a distance, companies may capture 
                                                                                                                            
95 See MICELI, supra note 83, at 32. 
96 See id. 
97 See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 124. 
98 See id.; supra Part II.A.1. 
99 See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2084; Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-
Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1527 (2013). 
100 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth 
Century Economics, 92 Q.J. ECON. 1441, 1448 (2002); Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. 
Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 553, 559 (1999). 
101 See Stiglitz, supra note 100, at 1448. 
102 See supra Part I.C. 
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biometrics without an individual’s knowledge. Further, companies 
may use the same biometric in nonrivalrous ways.103 In fact, it 
would be inefficient for every company to collect the same informa-
tion, thus incentivizing the sharing of biometrics. The more com-
panies that use a characteristic, the less valuable that characteristic 
will be for security purposes. Individuals, unable to exclude such 
companies, will be harmed by a company’s choice to use their bio-
metrics. 
3. Information Asymmetries 
Inefficiency can stem from information asymmetry—the scena-
rio where the information available to the transaction parties is very 
different.104 The imbalance may occur when information is with-
held, misrepresented, or too costly to uncover.105 While informa-
tion asymmetries are common, that one party merely has more in-
formation than another party is not the critical problem.106 Rather, 
inefficiencies arise where the information disparity has a negative 
effect on the parties’ negotiations and the functioning of the mar-
ket.107 
In the personal information market, information asymmetries 
exist between collectors and the individuals whose information is 
collected.108 First, individuals are often unaware that their informa-
tion is being collected.109 Second, even if an individual is aware, she 
does not know how the information may be used or if it will be 
shared.110 Many individuals also lack an understanding of how pri-
vacy and security are affected by technology.111 
                                                                                                                            
103 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Private Versus Social Incentives in Cybersecurity: Law and 
Economics, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 13, 21 (Mark F. Grady & 
Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) (discussing cybersecurity information as a public good). 
104 See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 171–72. 
105 See id. 
106 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1997). 
107 See id. 
108 See Netanel, supra note 87, at 476; Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2080. 
109 See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2078. 
110 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in 
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850 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:831 
 
The same disparities occur with the collection of biometrics. 
Some biometrics can be captured without an individual’s know-
ledge. A fingerprint can be lifted from another object, gait can be 
recorded from a distance, and face and voice samples are easily 
captured by cameras, phones, and other devices. Even if an indi-
vidual consents to the collection, the processing of that information 
may be unknown. For example, the banks collecting voice samples 
did not disclose all relevant information to their customers. While 
the bank provided a warning that calls may be recorded, the notice 
did not specify that the voice samples are processed into voice-
prints, or that the bank may share the voiceprint with other com-
panies.112 
Collectors are not incentivized to be forthright. Rather, compa-
nies use vague privacy policies and terms of service that do not ac-
curately explain the company’s practices.113 A company often re-
serves the right to change its policy or terms at any time and with-
out notice.114 If individuals had all relevant information, they may 
not choose to freely trade their biometrics. As such, information 
asymmetries in a biometric market lead to inefficiencies. 
4. Cognitive Limitations 
Economic theory assumes that humans are rational actors who 
make rational decisions in the face of uncertainty.115 Individuals are 
presumed to be forward-looking “utility maximizers.”116 However, 
behavioral economists argue that humans err, causing significant 
harms and leading to market failure and inefficiency.117 Common 
cognitive mistakes include time inconsistencies, ignoring shrouded 
attributes, unrealistic optimism, and difficulty assessing risk.118 
Economists believe that humans consider both the short-term 
and long-term costs and benefits.119 However, studies have found 
                                                                                                                            
112 See Satter, supra note 46. 
113 See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2080. 
114 See id. 
115 See MALLOY, supra note 73, at 145; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition 
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995). 
116 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 110, at 16. 
117 See Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1830, 1842. 
118 See id. at 1842–52. 
119 See id. at 1842–44. 
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that humans are impulsive and have difficulty accounting for the 
future.120 Humans have a tendency to place more weight on the 
present than the future.121 These judgment errors cause individuals 
to make choices with short-term benefits without considering the 
long-term costs, and vice-versa.122 When faced with a privacy deci-
sion, individuals often accept whatever terms a collector proposes 
in exchange for personal information.123 Individuals will make the 
same errors when confronted with a decision about providing bio-
metrics. An individual will be more concerned with gaining access 
to a service than with considering the consequences to her identity 
if the biometric system is compromised in the future. 
Studies have also shown that humans are only able to pay atten-
tion to a limited number of things, and items that are inconspicuous 
often get ignored.124 Even if the hidden items—“shrouded 
attributes”—are important, humans are prone to ignore them, 
sometimes to their detriment.125 Even if they do not ignore 
shrouded costs or benefits, humans may undervalue them or fail to 
recognize them until the future.126 These human errors are hig-
hlighted in privacy decision making, where the costs and benefits 
are complex and frequently bundled with other items.127 Individu-
als have difficulty processing all the relevant information and in-
stead rely on simplified models.128 The same occurs when biome-
trics are part of a transaction. A person may not see or consider fac-
tors such as if the characteristic is stored or disclosed. Using li-
mited information, particularly excluding such important items, 
leads an individual to suboptimal decisions regarding her biome-
trics. 
                                                                                                                            
120 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 110, at 27–28; Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1830. 
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Another cognitive mistake is that humans are unrealistically op-
timistic.129 Humans tend to downplay bad news, preventing them 
from taking precautions against serious harms.130 An individual 
faced with the choice about providing her biometric may weigh the 
promised security against potential disclosures. Collectors may also 
be faced with the same situation, where they must choose whether 
to implement a biometric system. A company may mispredict the 
dangers involved with utilizing the technology. 
Finally, evidence suggests that humans are poor risk asses-
sors.131 Decisions are often based on emotions and heuristics.132 An 
individual will consider immediately available knowledge without 
further investigation.133 This practice leads to miscalculating the 
probability of certain outcomes, either overestimating or underes-
timating the risk.134 An individual faced with a choice about biome-
trics will not likely have available examples or knowledge to rely 
upon. As an emerging consumer technology, most individuals are 
unfamiliar with how the technology works or the dangers it poses. 
B. Personhood and Market-Inalienability 
Opposite to economic theory is Margaret Radin’s personality 
theory, which focuses on the importance of identity and preserving 
the integrity and continuity of the self.135 She views entitlements, 
rights, or attributes on a continuum from fungible to personal, 
based on how connected it is to personhood; the more personal, the 
more the entitlement should be protected.136 When something is 
significant to personhood, loss of that thing will cause pain that 
cannot be relieved even by replacing the item.137 This is because 
personhood depends on the expectation of continuity, where an 
                                                                                                                            
129 See Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1849. 
130 See id. at 1849–50. 
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133 See Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1851–52. 
134 See id. 
135 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 55 (1996). 
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2015] BIOMETRIC BOOM 853 
 
individual anticipates something to be part of her future self.138 Ra-
din notes that bodies are literal components of personhood.139 She 
believes that the concept of “universal commodification”—that 
personal attributes are monetizable and detachable from the per-
son—undermines personal identity; instead, substantive characte-
ristics of personality must be inalienable.140 
Inalienability is the notion that something cannot be separated 
from its holder.141 The term is often used for entitlement, rights, or 
attributes that may not be forfeited, cancelled, waived, relin-
quished, given, sold, or transferred.142 The category of inalienabili-
ty at issue here is salability—the extent to which an entitlement 
cannot be transferred between buyers and sellers.143 Radin argues 
that some things should be outside the market but not necessarily 
outside of social interactions, a category she calls “market-
inalienability.”144 
Market-inalienability supposes that commodification is a conti-
nuum. Something does not have to be completely inside or outside 
the market, but rather it may only be nonsalable in certain con-
texts.145 For example, human organs cannot be sold on the free 
market but may be transferred by gift. Unlike inalienabilities that 
cannot be separated from the person—social security benefits or 
the right to vote—market-inalienabilities are not inseparable from 
the person, only that the market is not the cause of separation.146 
Under the concept of market-inalienability, Radin believes 
things have commodified and noncommodified versions, and ar-
gues that it may be necessary to prohibit the commodified version 
of certain things.147 Prohibition should be used when the market 
harms personhood, such as allowing individuals to freely commodi-
                                                                                                                            
138 See id. at 968. 
139 See id. at 966. 
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142 See id. at 17. 
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fy themselves; separately, it may be necessary to protect the non-
commodified version of a good because it fosters personhood.148 
Radin uses “love, friendship, and sexuality” as examples: commo-
dification of these goods will degrade the person and noncommodi-
fication is morally necessary for society.149 She claims that the ap-
propriate mechanism to simultaneously protect and foster person-
hood is regulation.150 
Under Radin’s personality theory, biometrics are personal. The 
pain of losing one’s identity, through a biometric system or other-
wise, would be quite severe. Human attributes that allow others to 
recognize each other are closely aligned with a person’s being, and 
individuals identify themselves through these attributes. As such, 
they are essential to personhood and warrant protection. However, 
that is not to say biometrics are so central to a person’s being that 
they cannot be separated from that person. That notion would 
render biometrics inalienable. Humans cannot be restricted from 
enjoying each others’ characteristics, many of which are accessible 
and freely given away. Individuals interact with others every day, 
using their voice, showing their faces, and touching things around 
them. There is no way to prevent a transfer of that information. 
The only way to make biometrics completely inalienable would be 
to put all humans in isolation. 
Therefore, Radin’s concept of market-inalienability fits biome-
trics well. Just as with emotions, bodily integrity, and other social 
interactions, biometrics should be precluded from market transac-
tions. Allowing a human attribute to be traded and monetized will 
degrade personhood. Applying Radin’s theory that commodified 
and noncommodified versions can coexist, only the commodified 
version of biometrics should be prohibited. A noncommodified ver-
sion of biometrics fosters personhood by promoting social interac-
tion. As stated above, human attributes that make an individual re-
cognizable are essential to daily life in society. Humans cannot 
function in society without the ability to share their identities with 
those around them. Therefore, a nonmonetized version, where 
biometrics may be given away, should be protected. 
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Radin notes that regardless of whether a market is efficient, in-
tervention is still justified where there is a commitment to protect 
things important to humanity.151 Restrictions on commodification 
would take into account personhood and foster nonmonetized 
identities. Therefore, some form of oversight and intervention is 
justified in order to balance commodified and noncommodified 
biometrics. 
III. AVAILABLE LEGAL TOOLS 
Privacy is handled, or mishandled, in a number of ways around 
the world. As the Part II discussed, there is a need to govern bio-
metrics in order to keep them from the market and prevent com-
modification. This Part considers the existing legal structures and 
how they apply to biometrics. First, there is an examination of self-
regulation, which dominates privacy in the United States, and how 
the notice-and-consent structure fails to adequately protect priva-
cy. Second is a review of current biometric legislation; specifically, 
the strategies utilized in the United States, European Union, and 
Canada. Finally, this Part considers choice architecture as a balance 
between autonomy and government regulation, and argues that a 
combination of disclosures, incentives, and light government regu-
lation may lead individuals and industry to make informed and bet-
ter decisions. 
A. Self-Regulation 
Privacy protection in the United States relies on self-
regulation.152 Privacy self-regulation is based on the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) of no-
tice, choice, access, security, and enforcement.153 The cornerstone 
to this structure is notice and consent, allowing many forms of col-
lection, use, and disclosure to be permissible.154 This model as-
sumes that individuals are rational and make informed decisions; 
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however, as shown in the discussion on market failure, that human 
construct is a fallacy.155 Consent is deemed essential because it pre-
serves an individual’s autonomy.156 However, individuals are often 
left with a binary choice: They must agree to provide personal in-
formation, or they will not receive the good or service. This often 
appears to be a choice to an individual, but in reality there is no ne-
gotiating.157 Further, providing choices is not the same as protect-
ing privacy.158 
Notice is preferred over forms of government regulation be-
cause it is easy and cheap to administer.159 A collector often pro-
vides notice through a privacy policy or terms of service, and an 
individual often has to affirmatively agree to the terms.160 Howev-
er, there are problems with these notices reaching individuals.161 
Even if an individual does receive a notice, studies show that indi-
viduals do not read or understand the policies or terms.162 Further, 
particularly with social media or other accounts, individuals often 
do not know how to change privacy settings.163 
The shortcomings of privacy self-regulation will have a detri-
mental impact on biometric decisions. If biometrics are treated like 
all other personal information, their collection and use will be go-
verned by consent and privacy policies. Further, as more institu-
tions implement biometric systems, individuals will be left with 
fewer choices as to whether they must enroll their characteristics. 
The burden is on the individual to make decisions that could have 
serious consequences. Notice and choice do not protect individuals 
from their bad decisions, nor do they incentivize collectors to avoid 
biometrics or adequately protect any collected characteristics. 
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B. Government Regulation 
1. United States 
Privacy laws in the United States are narrow, related to specific 
industries and based on who is collecting information rather than 
the nature of the information itself.164 The broadest legislation is 
the Privacy Act of 1974, which governs the federal government’s 
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.165 However, 
there are a number of exceptions and gaps that preclude biometrics 
from receiving protection.166 In fact, many federal agencies have 
been granted the authority to collect, use, and store personal in-
formation, including biometrics.167 Notably though, there is no fed-
eral legislation directly governing the collection and use of biome-
trics by the private sector, nor is there comprehensive privacy leg-
islation governing the private sector in which biometrics could fit. 
There is some oversight available from the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), which has taken on the role of enforcing pri-
vacy and data security.168 The FTC’s authority to regulate privacy 
and data security arises out of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which al-
lows the agency to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce.”169 However, enforcement is only based on 
written privacy policies provided by companies. Furthermore, 
there are no regulations or oversight of the security standards that 
should be used in biometric systems.170 As the technology becomes 
more pervasive, this lack of consistency will exacerbate the vulne-
rabilities of biometric systems.171 Individuals will enroll characteris-
tics in weak systems; because the same characteristic may be 
enrolled in more than one system, when the weak system is com-
promised, it will compromise the other biometrics systems as well. 
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On the local level, many states include biometrics within their 
definition of sensitive data or personal information under fraud, 
identity theft, or breach notification statutes.172 However, these 
laws are reactive—they address the information after it has been 
breached or misused. A few states have passed very specific restric-
tions on the collection and use of biometrics. For example, four 
states restrict collecting biometrics of children at school; however, 
with the exception of Florida, the laws still allow collection with a 
parent’s written consent.173 Another example is that New York 
generally prohibits fingerprinting as a condition of employment, 
but there are a number of exceptions for employees of state, munic-
ipal, and certain private industries.174 
Two states, Illinois and Texas, have passed laws that specifical-
ly apply to the private sector’s collection and use of biometrics.175 
Both state laws require an individual to be notified and consent to 
the collection, and restrict the collector’s ability to sell, lease, 
trade, or disclose the biometric without the individual’s further 
consent.176 Illinois also requires that a collector create a written pol-
icy with retention guidelines whereby the biometric is destroyed 
once the initial purpose has been satisfied or within three years of 
the individual’s last contact with the collector.177 Texas does not 
explicitly state any retention requirements beyond storage with 
reasonable care.178 Finally, both laws provide remedies for viola-
tions of the statute: Texas imposes a civil penalty, while Illinois 
creates a private right of action for affected individuals.179 
It is unclear how effective either the Illinois or Texas laws will 
be because many companies operate across state and national bor-
ders. It is also unlikely that many other states or the federal gov-
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ernment will pass similar laws. Ultimately, the inconsistencies and 
lack of regulation will do little to dissuade the private sector from 
upholding proper privacy or security practices with regard to bio-
metrics. 
2. European Union 
European Union Directive 95/46/EC,180 which governs the 
processing of personal data, also applies to biometrics. In a subse-
quent opinion, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party stated 
that the use of biometrics indicates processing personal data.181 
Therefore, biometrics “may only be processed if there is a legal 
basis and the processing is adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further 
processed.”182 The opinion applies the principles of purpose, pro-
portionality, necessity, and minimization to biometrics: it is a pre-
requisite to clearly define the purpose for which the biometrics will 
be collected and used; there must be consideration as to whether a 
biometric system is necessary and if the invasion of privacy is ba-
lanced by the anticipated benefit from using biometrics—the opi-
nion states that convenience is not a significant benefit to warrant 
the loss of privacy; only the information that is required for the 
specified purpose should be collected; and the information may 
only be stored for as long as it is necessary for the stated purpose.183 
The opinion also requires that biometrics be used legitimately. 
An individual whose biometric is collected and used must be aware 
that her biometric is being processed and she must provide freely 
given, specific and revocable consent.184 Further, the opinion see-
mingly precludes many private sector uses of biometrics by noting 
that: 
“Personal data are not goods that can be asked for 
in exchange of a service, therefore contracts that fo-
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resee that or contracts that offer a service only un-
der the condition that someone consents to the 
processing of his biometric data for another service 
cannot serve as legal basis for that processing.”185 
The opinion notes that the security of biometric systems is a 
concern because the characteristics are irrevocable and that the risk 
of theft increases with the more entities using biometrics.186 There-
fore, the opinion includes a number of technical recommendations, 
including that biometrics should be stored as templates instead of 
storing a sample or image of the actual characteristic; centralized 
databases should be avoided and local storage in cards, tokens, or 
other devices should be utilized instead; biometric data should be 
encrypted; and the data should be automatically deleted when no 
longer necessary.187 
EU member states may pass local laws that provide more pro-
tection than the Directive.188 Germany’s Passport Act prohibits a 
federal database of passport biometrics, and requires that passports 
may not be used by other agencies for automated retrieval of per-
sonal data.189 This provides that biometrics may only be stored on 
the passport chip and may only be used for border crossing security 
purposes.190 There is also pending law in France to restrict use of 
biometrics.191 The proposed law would ensure that biometrics are 
only used for strict security purposes, such as the safety of individ-
uals, property or information that could cause serious harm.192 Fur-
ther, biometrics would only be allowed if the risks to security are 
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high and if there is proportionality between the nature of the thing 
being protected and the biometric technology used.193 
3. Canada 
Canada’s approach to privacy regulation falls in between the 
extremes of the United States and the European Union.194 For 
many years, Canadian privacy protection was directed at govern-
ment entities.195 However, Canadian policy has shifted towards 
stricter regulation. In 2000, Canada passed the Personal Informa-
tion Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) which 
protected personal information across all private industries.196 
Quebec, and other provinces, subsequently passed more stringent 
privacy laws.197 
Quebec law includes rigid limitations on the collection, use, and 
storage of biometrics. Under this law, biometrics may not be used 
for identification or verification without express consent of the in-
dividual.198 The law stipulates that the characteristics collected 
must be ones that require the individual’s knowledge and that the 
number of characteristics is the minimum and necessary number 
for the purpose.199 Further, the biometric data must be destroyed 
once the initially stated purpose has been met or no longer ex-
ists.200 
The Quebec law also imposes requirements and restrictions on 
the use of databases.201 Prior to creation, a biometric database must 
be disclosed to the Commission d’accès à l’information, and any 
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existing databases must be disclosed as well.202 The Commission 
reserves the right to govern how a biometric database may be estab-
lished and used, as well as how the stored charactertics are main-
tained and destroyed.203 The Commission also reserves the right to 
prohibit any databases and order that existing databases be de-
stroyed.204 
As this section on government regulation demonstrated, the 
level of regulation over privacy and biometrics varies among juris-
dictions. The European and Canadian approaches are comprehen-
sive and strict; however, the United States is unlikely to pass any 
similar laws. On the other hand, the United States has no adequate 
system in place to govern biometrics. As the following section will 
show, there is an intermediary approach that may be the most feas-
ible solution for biometrics in the United States. 
C. Choice Architecture 
If self-regulation and government regulation are polar oppo-
sites, then choice architecture sits in the middle. Scholars Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler call this “libertarian paternalism.”205 
This theory is based on behavioral market failures, which exist in 
the privacy context.206 Paternalism is favored, but not necessarily 
in the form of strict government mandates.207 Instead, the response 
may be through disclosures, warnings, and default rules.208 These 
structures preserve autonomy but lead an individual towards mak-
ing the correct choices.209 
Choices are often determined by how they are framed. One ex-
ample is if an individual is considering a medical operation, she will 
be more agreeable if told the success rate than the mortality rate.210 
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This loss aversion explains why individuals are affected more when 
faced with a tax than a bonus.211 Similarly, they are more sensitive 
to price terms than nonprice terms.212 An example of this frame-
work is cigarettes.213 Smokers know cigarettes are unhealthy, but 
are more discouraged by the increasing tax than the health risks.214 
Smokers who are heavily taxed may eventually quit, a decision that 
makes them better off.215 
One method of employing choice architecture is through de-
fault rules. Humans are propelled by inertia, and most end up 
choosing the default rules or settings.216 Another means is through 
what Sunstein and Thaler call “RECAP” or record, evaluate, and 
compare alternative prices. Government regulation would govern 
disclosure, not prices, to better inform an individual’s decision 
making.217 Yet another means to lead individuals towards making 
the right choice is through incentives. Choice architects consider 
how to get the right incentives to the right individual in order to 
influence decisions.218 Loss aversion seems like a powerful incen-
tive on individuals, but it could be applied to companies as well. If 
acquiring consent is cumbersome and costly, a company will be 
discouraged from engaging in that particular collection and use.219 
Choice architecture provides a set of tools that can be con-
structed in such a way to deter the use of biometrics. It may be the 
most realistic solution available to govern biometrics in the United 
States. As the following Part discusses, building a regime of de-
faults, disclosures, and incentives will allow both the private sector 
and individuals to choose how to manage privacy and security yet 
slow the commodification of biometrics. 
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IV. DISCOURAGING THE ADOPTION OF BIOMETRICS 
Ideally, the best way to prevent the commodification of biome-
trics would be to prevent their use all together. Individuals place 
personal and nonmonetized value in their fingers, eyes, face, voice, 
and other attributes. The use of biometrics by the private sector, 
for a variety of purposes, monetizes the characteristics. The rapid 
growth of biometrics has led to the commodification of human cha-
racteristics and greater overall risks in using the technology. Con-
sidering how self-regulation fails to adequately protect personal 
privacy and government regulation is impractical in the United 
States, this Part argues that the best solution to protect biometrics 
is through choice architecture. A system of defaults, disclosures, 
and taxes will not completely prohibit the use of biometrics, but it 
will discourage companies and individuals from establishing and 
using such systems. The goal is to buy time by slowing the adoption 
of biometric technology in the hopes that more adequate protec-
tions and safeguards can be established. The following are a set of 
principles and tools, organized by phase of the biometric process, 
to guide the current transition towards biometrics. 
A. Collection 
Privacy is individualistic and varies between any two individu-
als. Therefore, it is critical to maintain autonomy and freedom of 
choice with biometric privacy. This will be accomplished through a 
strengthened model of notice and choice. First, there cannot be any 
collection without expressly informing an individual that her cha-
racteristic is being collected and for what purpose. Simply provid-
ing notice that voice samples are retained or images are stored is 
insufficient; the collector must warn that this information will be 
processed and used for recognition purposes. Furthermore, such 
notice must disclose the risks and vulnerabilities of using biome-
trics. The misconceptions of biometric accuracy and security must 
be dispelled. Liability for failing to adequately notify an individual 
will fall under the FTC’s authority to regulate unfair or deceptive 
trade practices. 
The next step is consent, which must be affirmative and specif-
ic to each biometric. The default should be to use means other than 
biometrics, requiring individuals to opt-in to the collection. To ef-
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fectively construct an opt-in default, goods and services should not 
be conditioned upon providing biometrics. Opt-in permission 
forces an individual to consciously choose biometric collection. If 
an individual makes the choice to enroll in a biometric system, 
there should be sufficient and conspicuous warnings before the 
enrollment takes effect. 
Collectors must not use biometrics unless other means are con-
sidered insufficient for the stated purpose, and only resort to using 
biometrics if absolutely necessary. If a biometric system does ap-
pear to be required, only the minimum amount of information 
should be collected. Further, taxation should be used as a means to 
incentivize individuals and companies. Taxing companies that col-
lect and use biometrics would discourage the companies from im-
plementing such systems. A tax would force companies to conduct 
a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the tradeoffs were economi-
cal, and ultimately weigh whether the supposed security from using 
biometric systems outweighs the tax. These tax costs would trickle 
down to individuals, whereby they are charged a fee or premium to 
enroll in biometric systems. Since humans are more concerned 
with prices than intangible concepts like privacy, this tax will dis-
courage both companies and individuals from resorting to biome-
trics. 
B. Use 
Biometrics should not be used for security purposes, but in-
stead be limited to value-add or innovation uses. These purposes 
are more consistent with society’s current acceptance of biome-
trics, as something personal and nonmonetized. The goal is to 
promote a use of biometrics that enhances social interactions, 
without stifling scientific innovation. Furthermore, use of biome-
trics for security purposes makes the characteristics and security 
systems appealing to criminals. Since the technology is vulnerable, 
the more biometrics are used for security the more likely it is that 
the systems will be targeted and compromised. However, the 
movement towards biometrics for security seems to be inevitable. 
Should security purposes be a necessary use of biometrics, all 
biometric systems should be used for multi-factor authentication 
with two or more characteristics being matched simultaneously. 
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This reduces the risk of certain types of attacks, such as spoofing, 
and ensures that even if one biometric has been compromised, 
hackers will have to expend a significant amount of resources in 
order to attack two or more characteristics. Finally, any collected 
biometric data should not be sold, traded, or disclosed. This in-
cludes sharing with other entities within the same industry. The 
value of the biometric will be diluted the more places it is used. 
C. Storage and Access 
Centralized storage of information increases the risk of disclo-
sure and breaches. To the extent the characteristics can be stored 
locally instead of in a central database, the less risky it will be to the 
collector and individual. To this end, there should be a tax on bio-
metric databases. There must be a system that incentivizes compa-
nies away from centrally storing biometrics. The tax will also force 
a company to evaluate if balkanized storage will be a sufficient, and 
ultimately less risky method of storing the information. However, 
regardless of whether the biometric is stored in a database or local-
ly, the data must be properly encrypted to add a further layer of 
protection. As with notice, the FTC may impose liability for inade-
quate data security under its authority to regulate unfair and decep-
tive business practices. 
Additionally, it is important that biometric systems allow indi-
viduals a right of access. Characteristics change over time, and the 
technology occasionally makes mistakes. An individual should have 
the ability to correct the template. Further, an individual should 
also have the ability to request that her biometric template be de-
stroyed. For example, if an individual chooses to enroll in one 
bank’s authentication system, but then chooses to bank elsewhere, 
her biometric should not remain in a different bank’s system. Final-
ly, the choice to enroll in a biometric system must be reversible. 
There have to be available alternatives that allow an individual to 
receive the same good or service without enrolling her biometrics. 
CONCLUSION 
With the help of technological advances and the private sec-
tor’s interest, biometrics are rapidly invading daily life. Fingers are 
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more than parts of the body; they are they keys to an account. Fac-
es and voices are no longer something only shared with individuals 
nearby, but tradable goods with value to companies. The rapid 
growth of biometrics is turning once nonmonetized attributes into 
something that can be traded and sold. This commodification in 
turn exposes the flaws of biometric technology, which will only be-
come exacerbated as more systems are implemented. Worse yet, 
biometric systems have inherent security flaws, and hackers will 
always be knocking at the door. Proponents looking to utilize bio-
metrics for security purposes are essentially handing identities to 
hackers and leaving individuals with irreplaceable identifiers. 
Without comprehensive privacy legislation, we are on the brink 
of a biometric crisis. The private sector will continue to find new 
ways to use biometrics, and the security systems that rely on that 
data will become useless. Therefore, it is wise to be proactive and 
structure a system of principles and incentives to at least discou-
rage reliance on biometrics. The proposed set of principles and 
tools in this Note will create hurdles in the race to adopt biome-
trics. Buying time to strengthen the technology and educate the 
public may be essential to protecting biometrics. Ultimately, indi-
viduals, companies, and the legal system must be better informed 
and prepared for when the technology fails. 
